Analysis of the Duration and Energy Consumption of AES Algorithms on a Contiki-based IoT Device by Tsao, Brandon
Santa Clara University 
Scholar Commons 
Computer Science and Engineering Master's 
Theses Engineering Master's Theses 
12-17-2019 
Analysis of the Duration and Energy Consumption of AES 
Algorithms on a Contiki-based IoT Device 
Brandon Tsao 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cseng_mstr 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons 

Analysis of the Duration and Energy Consumption




Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Masters of Science
in Computer Engineering
in the School of Engineering at
Santa Clara University, 2019
Santa Clara, California
Robots do not complain, question, or rest, which
makes them good role models for the rest of you.




First, I would like to extend an immeasurable thanks to my research advisor for his
immense amount of patience helping me through this work. I would also like to thank
my friends and family for encouraging me through my graduate studies journey.
iv
Analysis of the Duration and Energy Consumption of AES
Algorithms on a Contiki-based IoT Device
Brandon Tsao





With the growing prevalence of the Internet of Things, securing the sheer abundance of
devices is critical. The current IoT and security landscapes lack empirical metrics on
encryption algorithm implementations that are optimized for constrained devices, such
as encryption/decryption duration and energy consumption. In this paper, we achieve
two things. First, we survey for optimized implementations of symmetric encryption
algorithms. Seconds, we study the performance of various symmetric encryption algo-
rithms on a Contiki-based IoT device. This paper provides encryption and decryption
durations and energy consumption results on three implementations of AES: TinyAES,
B-Con’s AES, and Contiki’s own built-in AES. In our experiments, we found the algo-
rithms specifically built for constrained devices used about 0.16 the energy and time to
perform encryption and decryption when compared to algorithm implementation that
weren’t optimized for constrained devices.
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The Internet of Things (IoT) is taking the world by storm, with solutions ranging from
consumer convenience to life-critical systems. By the year 2020, there will be over 20
billion digital devices [1], which also means 20 billion distinct points of vulnerability.
For example, implanted and networked medical devices such as pacemakers are already
common [2]. While the Internet connectivity will allow streamlined patches from retail-
ers, it also paves a path for potential hackers, as with the case of St. Jude Medical’s
Quadra Allure MP [3], where half a million pacemakers were recalled for a vulnerability
that could grant unauthorized access. The consequences could be as major as the loss of
personally identifiable medical data and as critical as the actual loss of life. Even seem-
ingly innocuous devices such as DVR boxes could be leveraged in large-scale attacks,
such as when a Mirai IoT Botnet [4] orchestrated one of the most prominent DDoS
attacks in modern computing history. Self-driving cars could be driven o↵ roads. Water
flow sensors could be silenced, preventing the alerting of a flood, or worse, fed false data
to actuate cybermechanical systems to actually start a flood [5]. The list goes on.
Unfortunately, while securing all these devices is certainly a good idea, traditional means
of security does not scale well to the IoT landscape. The small physical size of many IoT
devices, also known as motes, forces the use of smaller processors with fewer registers
and less cache memory. Additionally, IoT devices usually prefer batteries over a power
grid as a source of electrical power. While wired solutions exist, battery power usually
allows for faster, cheaper, and more flexible installations in many cases. Most IoT
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devices are constrained in terms of both processing power and energy consumption.
Unfortunately, this makes it di cult to implement secure cryptographic algorithms and
related operations that are known for their heavy footprint in both of these resources.
Regardless, a compromise must be reached the secure IoT devices. There has been much
work trying to create security algorithms and protocols that specifically address the
limitations of IoT [6]. Regardless of their viability, however, new encryptions algorithms
have not been trialed as much, and present a larger risk of containing undiscovered
bugs. On the other hand, traditional algorithms have been tried and proven to be
robust in most circumstances. However, IoT does not fall under the purview of “most
circumstances”; IoT devices cannot be treated as normal, classical computing devices.
Unfortunately, there is little empirical data on how well traditional algorithms actually
perform on IoT devices, or how modified algorithms hold up. Will traditional algorithms
take too long? Or will they use too much power, reducing a mote’s lifetime to a mere
hour? Will modified algorithm implementations prove to be just as secure? They might
have less clock cycles, but do they actually use less power? While doing a survey, there
were few papers found that provided actual data on the performance of traditional
algorithm implementations and those optimized for constrained devices.
To fill the gap in the current space, we obtain various metrics regarding power usage
and encryption/decryption duration for various algorithmic implementations of Rijndael
AES [7], the eponymous Advanced Encryption Standard. We conduct experiments using
multiple traditional and modified algorithm implementations on a constrained device,
specifically the Texas Instruments CC2650 [8]. The CC2650 is a highly power-e cient
System on a Chip (SoC) including an ARM Cortex-M3 processor and wireless connectiv-
ity transceivers. This device runs Contiki, which is a lightweight, event-based operating
system. We quantitatively determine the extent to which optimized algorithms yield
better results in both of these aspects. Additionally, we investigate why they fared bet-
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ter, by examining the source code of the algorithmic implementations. We found what
one might expect: that optimized algorithmic implementations performed far better
than the ones that were not optimized or were optimized for higher power devices. In
the experiments, multiple input payload sizes are used and all AES implementations
scaled linearly with these inputs, which was also expected.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Related work is examined in Chapter 2.
We briefly give an overview of the Rijndael AES algorithm in Chapter 3. Experimental
setup and methodology is explained in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses results and




Regarding the survey portion of this thesis, we first survey other papers regarding the
state of security regarding IoT in addition to the specific security problems that IoT
faces. Second, explore attempted optimizations of IoT specific security solutions, espe-
cially ones that reduce required processing power or energy. Third, find and consolidate
hard data regarding these optimizations, focusing on symmetric encryption algorithms
that run on edge devices.
Kai Zhao and Lina Ge [9] performed a high level analysis in 2013, suggesting that IoT
not only does has to deal with the same security issues as other information domains,
but also faces other unique issues such as privacy protection and heterogeneous network
authentication and authorization. The paper claims that IoT solutions will continue to
grow into larger networks, making the task of securing the network much more di cult.
Most IoT solutions aim for (i) comprehensive perception, (ii) reliable transmission, and
(iii) intelligent processing.
(i) Comprehensive perception is a measurement of an edge device’s ability to consis-
tently, accurately, and reliably obtain information about an object, e.g. successfully
taking a temperature reading from a room every hour. (ii) Reliable transmission is a
measurement of how many transmissions make it from their source to their destination,
e.g. sending the temperature readings from an edge device to a base station, and the
base station forwarding the information to a cloud server. (iii) Intelligent Processing
is a measurement is the actual computation of data (and where it is processed), e.g.
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taking an average of the temperature readings in the cloud.
Availability comes into play with both (i) comprehensive perception and (ii) reliable
transmission, as the prevalent nature and generally unsecured physical location of edge
motes makes it relatively easy to disrupt. Unlike a cloud server which is locked behind
a metal cabinet in a patrolled data center, edge motes often exist in easily-accessible
public spaces. Denial of a mote would then be as easy as physically destroying the
mote. Confidentiality also poses a large issue. If nodes aren’t encrypted, physical access
would immediately lead to the leakage of sensitive data, such as communications keys
and destination IPs. Physical access also opens up a variety of side channel attacks that
could defeat encryption, such as Di↵erential Power Analysis, which can speed up the
time it takes to crack an encryption key.
(ii) Reliable transmission and (iii) intelligent processing are more closely related to
traditional security issues of the network layer and application layer. As such, they do
not need to be addressed specifically in regards to IoT security and will not be discussed
here.
Canteaut et al. [10] suggest multiple encryption algorithms that are suitable for IoT.
Stream ciphers are especially good candidates, as they do not require padding and
decryption can begin as soon as any amount of data is received. Creating additional
padding, as would be done in a block cipher, takes additional processing power. The
constant but potentially erratic transmission nature of edge motes encourages schemes
which can encrypt/decrypt without a full discrete unit of data. Unfortunately, industry
standards tend to prefer block ciphers such as AES. Some of these can be considered
block-based stream ciphers, e.g. AES in CTR mode. However, these modes still fall
behind in throughput and latency compared to dedicated stream ciphers. Therefore,
dedicated stream ciphers are still preferred in IoT applications. Specifically, the authors
strongly recommend the following stream ciphers: Grain v1, HC-128, MICKEY, Rabbit,
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Salsa20/12, Sosemanuk, and Trivium. In our thesis, we want to provide hard data with a
popular block cipher in a non-streaming mode. This will provide necessary information
when deciding between the trade-o↵s of a stream cipher vs a block cipher.
Hui Suo et al. [11] performed a similar review. Their literature highlights the impor-
tance of key management and node authentication. Security measures such as frequency
hopping communication and public-key encryption are less practical with the limited
electric power, processing power, and storage capacity of constrained devices. The lack
of asymmetric cryptography further highlights the di culty in setting up secure keys
among a considerably large number of motes. Assuming that keys can be set up, by-hop
encryption poses certain dangers as each node might have a plaintext version of the data
to be transmitted. This danger is increased in the IoT landscape, as nodes are more
susceptible to physical capture. However, the need in fully encrypting environmental
sensor data (e.g. weather temperature readings) is less important, as it would be easier
for an attacker to simply place their own sensor in the same area, assuming the environ-
ment is public. In this scenario, it would be more important to ensure the integrity and
authenticity of the sensor data, i.e. guaranteeing the sensor data is accurate and not
tampered with. Privacy and confidentiality come more into play in regards to medical
sensor data, such as human temperature readings, in which leaked data could result
in legal issues. The literature also briefly mentions the lack of regulatory legislature
regarding IoT due to its fairly young existence.
Xinlei Wang et al. [12] propose a solution for the issue of key management: Attribute
Based Encryption (ABE). Traditional encryption schemes usually require each node to
know not only the identity of the other nodes in the cluster, but also to have credentials
that would allow secure communications, i.e. both nodes having a public key to allow
the sharing of a symmetric key. In ABE, nodes do not need to pre-share secrets, which
simplifies key management, especially in an IoT landscape. However, this literature
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focuses on ABE for mobile devices. While mobile devices can certainly play a critical role
in IoT, especially as access points for smaller devices, they usually are not as restricted
as actual edge motes. As ABE is still constrained by the complex mathematics as all
public key cryptographic schemes, it may not be the best solution for smaller motes.
The paper provides hard data on execution time, data / network overhead, energy
consumption, and CPU usage to allow for better informed decisions when considering
the trade-o↵s of this scheme.
These experiments utilized a laptop with a 64-bit 1.60 GHz processor and 4 GB of RAM
and a smartphone running Android 4.04 with a 32-bit, 1.6 GHz processor and 1GB of
RAM. On both devies, ABE took longer and utilized more CPU and memory than
RSA, the more traditional algorithm that was used for comparison. In the literature’s
conclusion, “without significant improvement, the classic ABE algorithms are best used
when the computing device has relatively high computing power and the applications
demand low to medium security.” However, the literature also points out that ABE
allows for better flexibility regarding access control, which would be a key factor in an
IoT landscape.
From our survey of the state of security of IoT, we found the main issues barring
traditional security measures were scalability (in the case of key management and mass
node authentication) and resource usage. If traditional symmetric encryption algorithms
were optimized for IoT devices and used less resources, they could be better used in
conjunction with novel key management schemes. In the case that traditional key
management schemes and traditional symmetric encryption algorithms are used in an
IoT problem space, the same algorithms with optimized implementations should still
fare better. The next part of the survey is to gather the work done in this area and see
if optimized algorithmic implementations provide positive benefits.
Salajegheh et al. [13] explore various software methods of reducing energy consumption.
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The authors mainly achieved this by avoiding as much local context switching as possi-
ble, especially the declaration of local variables within local functions. This limits the
amount of context switching, and therefore the number pushes and pops a program has
to carry out. These are expensive operations, and reducing them as much as possible
will reduce energy. In the realm of encryption algorithms, however, these techniques
might not be suitable for immediate IoT implementation for various reasons: (i) altering
function scope can a↵ect how the algorithm leverages memory, possibly opening more
vectors for side channel attacks; (ii) memory changes can also a↵ect how addresses are
assigned, possibly increasing the chances of another function accessing sensitive variable
information; and (iii) programs must limit local variables and functions, forcing redun-
dant code which will increase the size of the binary. However, these are not necessarily
negative consequences, but need to be considered when weighing di↵erent trade-o↵s.
Additionally, we must consider the use cases and context of such optimizations. Often
times, changing function scope would not only require the modification of the core
operating systems of the constrained device to implement various encryption algorithms
by default, but would also require those functions to be part of the actual operating
system. Calling these “pseudofunctions” could pose an even greater di culty as many
libraries requiring encryption would then have to invoke the operating system itself to
perform encryption and decryption. Not only does this pose a security risk by giving
external function access to OS level variables, but it also requires a costly context switch,
which most likely undoes the savings gained by globalizing variables.
One of NEC’s technical journals [6] also proposes a new algorithm altogether, specifically
designed for constrained devices. NEC’s own TWINE algorithm [14] can achieve a lower
power footprint than that of AES by using customized hardware, which uses 2k gates
compared to the 15k gates of a similar AES hardware core implementation. Of course,
this requires said specialized hardware. AES still outperforms TWINE in pure software
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implementations, though the executable of TWINE can achieve sizes as low as 500 bytes.
This algorithm, while tested by NEC itself and others, is still less vetted than classic
algorithms such as AES, and is not yet as popular in terms of encryption standards.
Another way of reducing power while still using traditional algorithms is to create ded-
icated hardware to perform said algorithms. By performing the necessary arithmetic
operations of an encryption algorithm directly using gates allows the bypass of various
layers of software abstraction (and their accompanied hardware), therefore reducing the
overall power. Hardware also gives the advantage of generally being more resistant to
side channel attacks, as they are usually less transparent and more di cult to directly
interact with without physical access, usually acting like black boxes.
While the arithmetic operations can simply be carried out by normal arithmetic gates
in serial, it makes sense to optimize the hardware to achieve as much as possible in a
single clock cycle. There are di↵erent approaches to this with varying levels of trade-o↵s
in terms of power usage, chip size, flexibility and scalability.
Hamalainen et al. [15] have created chips specifically designed to minimize the number
of gates, therefore reducing overall chip size and power consumption. They managed to
reduce the number of gates to about 3,100. With a 153 MHz clock, the chip is able to
achieve a 121 Mbps throughput of encryption via AES 128. Using 30 to 62 µW/Mhz,
this is about 4.8 to 9.9 nJ per block encrypted/decrypted.
S. Mangard et al. [16] created a chip architecture that focused on flexibility and scal-
ability, having a total gate equivalent of 10,800. Operating with a 64 Mhz clock, the
standard chip achieved throughput of 128 Mbps, with a high-performant variation using
about 15,500 gates running a throughput of 241 Mbps. This paper unfortunately did not
include power measurements, but we can assume the larger gate footprint would result
in larger power usage. Looking at the quantified results, S. Mangard et al.’s architecture
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outperforms Hamalainen et el but uses more gates, and therefore more power.
However, such solutions would require hardware additions to each constrained device,
as well as firmware/software to interface with it for encryption/decryption, which would
likely incur an upfront redesign cost. This needs to be considered a trade o↵, as this
initial cost could still reduce costs in the long-run if lower power consumption leads to
less maintenance or longer field life.
The thesis of A.A.A.Y Hassan et al. [17] outlines some empirical data collected on
various symmetric key algorithms, such as AES and Blowfish [18]. We will expand on
some of these findings later in this thesis. While the paper was oriented toward the
IoT landscape, the tests were done on a laptop with a 64-bit Intel i5 processor running
Windows 10. The thesis provides metrics on encryption duration, space complexity,
and throughput. For a message inputs from 62 bytes to 223 bytes, AES and Blowfish
performed similarly in terms of time and throughput, with Blowfish outperforming AES
after 283 bytes, taking 0.80 and 1.24 times the time and throughput, respectively. How-
ever, there was only a second data point after 223 bytes so it’s unclear whether this
improvement continued or what the rate of further improvement was. It is also unclear
if these improvements would translate to a more constrained device. Nonetheless, the
paper recommends Blowfish for IoT given its reduced encryption time and increased
throughput over AES.
A similar paper by Michael Healy et al. [19] examined hardware and software implemen-
tations of three symmetric block-cipher encryption algorithms: Rijndael AES, RC5, and
Skipjack. Of these algorithms, AES remains to be the most secure. RC5 is vulnerable to
di↵erential attacks, in which an attacker would be able to obtain the encryption key pro-
vided they are able to encrypt a number of chosen plaintexts. However, in practice 244
of these plaintext/ciphertext pairs would be required to obtain the secret key, deemed
by the paper’s authors to be unlikely in the landscape of wireless sensor networks and
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IoT. Additionally, the authors predicted that Skipjack’s 80-bit key could be vulnerable
to an exhaustive key attack within five years of the paper’s writing. That date has
since passed, and it is reasonable that this key can be brute forced by contemporary
computing resources.
When testing AES, two platforms were used: A MICAz mote with 4 KB RAM and 512
KB NVM storage, and a Tmoke Sky mote with 10 KB RAM and 1 KB NVM storage.
Both of these platforms contain a CC2420 radio chip with hardware security support,
including encryption via AES-128. However, the chip does not provide the ability to
perform AES-128 decryption, only encryption. This is likely a design choice, as forgoing
decryption capabilities will produce a smaller chip and sensor motes often do not need to
receive secure, encrypted data. Additionally, certain AES modes do not require separate
decryption functions, such are CTR mode.
While the paper went over results from all algorithms, we will only discuss the results of
the hardware and software AES as those are most relevant to this thesis. In performing
actual encryption, hardware AES on the MICAz was performed 49 times faster than the
software implementation. On the Tmote sky, hardware AES was only 4 times faster. In
both experiments, the hardware AES implementation used less RAM than its software
counterparts.
Shammi Didla’s paper [20] is the closest in theme to this thesis, exploring their own
AES optimizations in reducing RAM, ROM, and executable size for edge devices and
outlining the methods used to achieve these optimizations. They even use a similar edge
device as this thesis, a TI CC2420. The optimizations implemented are similar to the
ones utilized in the algorithms we analyzed. The paper gives a concise overview of the
types of optimizations often used: (i) specialization of code, (ii) varying data sizes, (iii)
loop unrolling, (iv) function inlining, (v) reducing memory moves, (vi) eliminating local
bu↵ers, and the (vii) use of global variables.
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Specialization of code would involve cutting out superfluous options that do not directly
pertain to the task at hand. With regards to AES, this means only loading necessary
tables for a given key size, e.g. 128, as di↵erent key sizes require di↵erent constants.
This is explored more in this thesis in Results and Discussion Chapter (5)
Using varying data sizes that suit the processor size of the target machine understand-
ably a↵ects performance. For example, using 16-bit types on a 1-bit or greater processor
will allow for more e cient operations, but would hard fail on a 8-bit machine.
Reducing memory moves, eliminating local bu↵ers, and using global variables are all
examples of trying to reduce scope and state changes as much as possible. Depending
on the processor, changing local bu↵ers or passing pointers compiles to varying numbers
of operations, as di↵erent processors handle memory access di↵erently. Having a solid
understanding the processor, one can pick the option which will reduce the total number
of operations the most. Taking this further, one can also exploit the C precompiler to
define values to achieve a similar a↵ect.
Loop unrolling and function inlining are similar optimizations in which loops of iterables
and functions calls are replaced with repeated code, i.e. the entity that was being loops
or the contents of a function. This reduces array accesses and scope changes but reduces
code readability and greatly increases the source code size.
However, the paper showed that only some of these optimizations had a significant e↵ect
on RAM/ROM usage and encryption/decryption duration, such as specializing the code
to the keysize, which led to a 184% increase in key expansion speed.
The paper also explains that GNU GCC has flags (O1, O2, O3) to automatically attempt
its own optimizations such as loop unrolling, function inlining and register renaming.
However, these automatic attempts did not result in the same gains and sometimes
even had negative impacts, as was the case with the O3 compiler option which enables
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automatic loop unrolling, resulting in a 14% decrease in encryption/decryption speed
and also increasing code size by a factor of 3. In the paper’s experiments, almost all





We chose to examine symmetric key encryption algorithm implementations primarily
because most communication over the wire is done with symmetric encryption, whereas
asymmetric algorithms are primarily used for key exchange protocols. For example, in
the HTTPS and SSH protocols, after a secret key exchange, data in flight is encrypted
with a symmetric key [21] [22]. For edge devices, this means that the majority of
encryption is done with symmetric encryption, assuming that public key generation and
symmetric key exchanges happen infrequently. This will especially be true if keys are
loaded on ROM flash or pre-shared before the edge device has been fielded. The issue of
regenerating a public-private key pair and constantly renegotiating symmetric key pairs
will not be covered in this thesis, but will be discussed in future work.
We specifically chose the Rijndael AES algorithm due to its ubiquity and current status
as an industry standard, as granted by NIST in 2001 [7]. There are many implementa-
tions of this algorithm in various languages, optimized for various platforms. This gave
us a wide selection of fair use and open source algorithmic implementations to test.
However, to understand how these di↵erent implementations are di↵erently optimized
for edge platforms, we must first understand how AES works in its various modes.
As a block cipher, AES operates on blocks, performing encryption per block of plaintext
to produce a block of cipher text. AES always operates on 128-bit blocks regardless of
key size (i.e. AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 all use 128-bit blocks). These blocks are
comprised of a 4x4 matrix of bytes, known as the state.
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Table 3.1: An example AES state of a plaintext block in hexadecimal
19 a9 9a e9
3d f4 c6 f8
e3 e2 8d 48
be 2b 2a 08
Table 3.2: An example AES key, represented as 4x4 matrix in hexadecimal
2b 28 ab 09
7e ae f7 cf
15 d2 15 4f
16 a6 88 3c
In order to perform encryption on plaintexts that are larger than the key size, the key
must first be expanded into round keys according to the Rijndael key schedule [7]. The
first word of every 128-bits of the key expansion starts with the operation RotWord,
which takes the previous word and rotates it leftwards. This transformation on the


















The result of RotWord then undergoes the substitution step (ii) SubBytes. This result
is then XORed with the word four position previous (the first column of Table 3.2), and
XORed again with the first round constant (Table 3.3).
The second, third, and fourth words of each 128-bit block is XORed with the word four
positions previous, forgoing the RotWord transformation and SubBytes substitution.
Table 3.3: The AES Round Constants in hexadecimal
01 02 04 08 10 20 40 80 1B 36
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Table 3.4: AES S-Box in hexadecimal
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
0 63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5 30 1 67 2b fe d7 ab 76
1 ca 82 c9 7d fa 59 47 f0 ad d4 a2 af 9c a4 72 c0
2 b7 fd 93 26 36 3f f7 cc 34 a5 e5 f1 71 d8 31 15
3 4 c7 23 c3 18 96 5 9a 7 12 80 e2 eb 27 b2 75
4 9 83 2c 1a 1b 6e 5a a0 52 3b d6 b3 29 e3 2f 84
5 53 d1 0 ed 20 fc b1 5b 6a cb be 39 4a 4c 58 cf
6 d0 ef aa fb 43 4d 33 85 45 f9 2 7f 50 3c 9f a8
7 51 a3 40 8f 92 9d 38 f5 bc b6 da 21 10 ↵ f3 d2
8 cd 0c 13 ec 5f 97 44 17 c4 a7 7e 3d 64 5d 19 73
9 60 81 4f dc 22 2a 90 88 46 ee b8 14 de 5e 0b db
a e0 32 3a 0a 49 6 24 5c c2 d3 ac 62 91 95 e4 79
b e7 c8 37 6d 8d d5 4e a9 6c 56 f4 ea 65 7a ae 8
c ba 78 25 2e 1c a6 b4 c6 e8 dd 74 1f 4b bd 8b 8a
d 70 3e b5 66 48 3 f6 0e 61 35 57 b9 86 c1 1d 9e
e e1 f8 98 11 69 d9 8e 94 9b 1e 87 e9 ce 55 28 df
f 8c a1 89 0d bf e6 42 68 41 99 2d 0f b0 54 bb 16
After the creation of the first roundkey, AES will go through nine, eleven, or thirteen
rounds of the following steps: (i) SubBytes, (ii) ShiftRows, (iii) MixColumns, and (iv)
AddRoundKey. It will then go through a final round which omits the (iii) MixColumns
step, only performing the (i) SubBytes, (ii) ShiftRows, and (iv) AddRoundKey steps.
The omission of (iii) MixColumns in the last step makes for easier decryption, as it allows
the decryption (inverse encryption) functions to better mirror the standard encryption
ones.
(i) SubBytes is a simple substitution step where elements of the state are swapped out
for elements according to a lookup table substitution box (S-Box). This S-Box is a
constant generated from the multiplicative inverse over the finite field GF (28). Notice
how the first cell in the example state (Table 3.1) acts as a lookup guide in S-Box (Table
3.4), where the digit “1” refers to the row number and the digit “9” refers to the column
number. This a ne transformation can also be expressed mathematically with matrices
(as below), with b0 the ith bit of a byte 01100011.
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Table 3.5: AES state after SubBytes.
d4 e0 b8 1e
27 bf b4 41
11 98 5d 52
ae f1 e5 30
2
666666666666666666664
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0




























This step, in conjunction with AddRoundKey, is the primary way that AES achieves
confusion. Confusion is a cryptographic property that measures how many parts the
encryption key a↵ects a single bit of the plaintext. The more confusion an encryption
algorithm provides, the more di cult it is to make out the relationship between the
plaintext and respective encryption key.
(ii) ShiftRows is a transposition step in which columns of the state are rotated. The
first row is ignored, while the second row is shifted left 1 byte, the third row shifted left
2 bytes, and the fourth row shifted right 3 bytes. The transformation after ShiftRows
from the current state (Table 3.5) can be seen in Table 3.6. This prevents the each col-
umn being encrypted independently with AES operating as four separate block ciphers
instead of a single unified one.
(iii) MixColumns is a linear transformation step. The columns of the state are multiplied
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Table 3.6: AES state after ShiftRows
d4 e0 b8 1e
bf b4 41 27
5d 52 11 98
30 ae f1 e5
Table 3.7: AES state after MixColumns
04 e0 48 28
66 cb f8 06
81 19 d3 26
e5 9a 7a 4c
within GF (28) by a constant matrix, one at a time.
2
66666664
02 03 01 01
01 02 03 01
01 01 02 03











The product of these matrices result in the first column in Table 3.7, which shows
the state after (iii) MixColumns. (iii) MixColumns in conjunction with (ii) Shift rows
is the primary way AES achieves di↵usion. Di↵usion is a cryptographic property that
measures of how much a given ciphertext would change if a single bit of the plaintext were
flipped or how much a given plaintext would change if a single bit of the ciphertext were
flipped.. The more di↵usion that an encryption algorithm provides, the more di cult
it is to make out the relationship between a plaintext and its respective ciphertext.



















The (iv) AddRoundKey is the step in which the encryption key directly a↵ects on the
plaintext.
While delineated as separate steps, these operations can be combined in various arrange-
ments, to reduce the total number of required operations to encrypt a block, thereby
increasing throughput. This is an important consideration when optimizing for di↵erent
goals and will be discussed in greater length in Results and Discussion Chapter 5.
Other than the actual key size, AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 di↵er in the number
of total rounds, with AES-128 running 10 rounds, AES-192 running 12 rounds, and
AES-256 running 14 rounds. The way the key itself is generated also di↵ers slightly, as
di↵erent key sizes utilize di↵erent elements of the round constant word array rcon. This
becomes important in optimizing for a smaller executable size, which will be discussed





In this thesis, we aim to evaluate the performance of Rijndael AES, a representative
symmetric key based cryptographic algorithm, on resource constrained IoT devices. We
choose to study AES as a non-proprietary, standardized algorithm because it is used
in modern information infrastructure (such as The Internet itself) and has been proven
itself reasonably secure since it is the current Federal Information Processing Standard
[7].
We tried and examined three AES implementations: TinyAES [23], B-Con’s AES [24],
and Contiki’s own built-in AES [25].
The first implementation, TinyAES, is a“small and portable implementation of the AES
ECB and CBC encryption algorithms written in C,” written by kokke [23]. TinyAES
provides four public functions, an encrypt and decrypt function for both ECD and CBC
modes. The entire module uses less than 200 bytes of RAM and 2.3 KB ROM when
compiled for 32-bit ARM. TinyAES has been optimized for 8-bit, 32-bit, and 64-bit
processors. Porting TinyAES into contiki only requires copying and including the aes.c
and aes.h files. Symlinking is a possible alternative, though was not implemented in
our tests.
The second implementation, B-con, has written a collection of cryptographic algorithms,
including AES in both ECB and CBC modes [24]. None of B-con’s AES algorithms have
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been optimized for speed or space. This library was included to test an AES library
that was not optimized for 8-bit processors. Porting B-con’s AES functions into Contiki
was similar to the porting of TinyAES.
The third implementation, Contiki AES, is the builtin AES library that comes with
contikiOS [25]. It can be found under contiki/core/lib/ [26]. This is actually a
wrapped implementation of Texas Instruments AES-128 implementation [27]. At the
moment, regarding platform independent functions, Contiki only provides the core AES
function, without supporting specific modes. ECB can be emulated by calling the AES
function on subsequent blocks, but CBC must be written independently. No additional
porting was necessary because this AES function is built-in to Contiki OS; however, since
we needed an apples-to-apples comparison of algorithm encryption/decryption modes,
we wrote our own CBC mode in accordance with NIST’s Recommendation for Block
Cipher Modes of Operation [28]. This source code is included in the Appendix.
To compare the energy and time cost of these implementations, we have adopted the
following test cases: all symmetric key algorithms were AES-128 operating solely in
the Cipher Block Chaining mode with constants KEY and IV (Initialization Vector); A
zeroed array of words IN (plaintext input payload) of SIZE bytes was encrypted into a
zeroed array of words OUT (encrypted output payload) of SIZE bytes. Array sizes from
8 bytes to 64 bytes were tested in steps of 8 bytes.
In terms of the evaluation platform, we use a RaspberryPi in tandem with a customized
Energy Measurement Platform for Wireless IoT Devices (EMPIOT)[29] to interpret the
triggers. This evaluation platform is primarily used for energy measurement.
The EMPIOT board allows us to physically measure power consumed in a given inter-
val. This is advantageous over using analytical and simulation-based energy estimation
schemes because the board measures the power used by a device’s physical later, allow-
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ing the measurement of systems which have not already been profiled for simulation. It
also takes into account all of the attached peripheral systems.
To conduct the energy measurement portion of the experiment, we use two GPIO pins,
connected from the power measurement board to the test board to act as the START and
STOP triggers for the power measurement, with an additional grounding pin. A double
male USB-A to Micro USB cable conducts the actual power measurement. Featuring a
sampling rate of approximately 1000 Hz, EMPIOT is accurate to 0.4 µW in its energy
measurement and has less than 3% error in energy measurement for IoT devices using
802.15.4 or 802.11 wireless standards. Therefore, it is used to collect all energy data
presented in this work.
Custom software on a GMPIOT board uses triggers to measure the shunt voltage,
amperage, and voltage at various clock intervals. By calculating a Lebesgue integral
provided below we are able to calculate the total energy consumption of various opera-
tions. Due to the low energy nature of IoT platforms, 1000 trials are always performed
in order to artificially increase the total energy. A 10 millisecond clock delay is also
introduced to allow the measurement triggers to properly reset between iterations of
each trial batch. The source code of all the mentioned custom software is included in
the Appendix A.
The ARM embedded tool chain is used to compile each Contiki binary. We use Texas
Instruments’ own UniFlash to flash the binary to the CC2650 sensortag. The utility
Screen was used to grab stdout and serial output from the cc2650 sensortag in order
to verify certain information, such as the bu↵er size of the current trial. While Contiki
comes with its own implementation of AES 128, it is only available in its most basic
form, only supporting the Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode. As such, we develop our
own C module to implement Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode. This implementation
is not strictly cryptographically-secure as it was not made with side-channel attacks in
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mind and has not been thoroughly tested.
Besides the energy consumption, we also evaluate the duration of a payload encryp-
tion and decryption, because a slow algorithm could reduce the overall performance
and increase latencies for other operations. This is typically directly correlated with
mathematical complexity: the more work a processor has to do, the longer it will take
to produce a valid result. This can be measured with clock cycles, which can then be
converted to a more human-friendly format, such as milliseconds.
The actual encryption and decryption duration measurements are performed using Con-
tiki’s builtin Rtimer library [26]. Rtimer was built to schedule real-time tasks. However,
we only used the library to obtain the current system time in ticks by taking the current
system time before and after the encryption or decryption of the input payload, taking
the di↵erence in ticks, and then converting the ticks to seconds via on a conversation
constant based on the platform architecture. To maintain consistency with the energy
measurements, 1000 trials were also performed per input payload.
Each algorithm was tested for both encryption and decryption on input payloads of 128,
256, 384, 512, 640, 768, 896, and 1024 bytes. Each input payload was hard-coded as
an array of 8-bit unsigned integer hexadecimal bytes. A custom python script was then
used to aggregate and average the collected data. The python plotting library matplotlib




In this work we mainly evaluated the energy consumption and encryption duration for
di↵erent AES implementations. Our results on mean energy usage and encryption/de-
cryption duration are shown in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, respectively, in which the five
curves represent the performance of the various encryption algorithm implementations.
The x-axis is composed of the input sizes of the encryption or decryption payloads,
which were multiples of 128 bites up to 1024 bites. The y-axis is the mean energy in
nanojoules of encryption or decryption times in milliseconds plot points, which are then
extrapolated to a best fitting function, which happens to be linear. Each encryption
algorithm implementation has its own color and marker which can be seen in the key of
both graphs: TinyAES encryption is represented by blue circle markers, TinyAES de-
cryption by green triangle markers, B-Con’s encryption by red square markers, B-Con’s
decryption by teal pentagon markers, and Contiki’s built-in encryption and decryption
by violet star markers. Error bars are included but are not visible as the standard de-
Table 5.1: Energy Consumption of TinyAES Encryption










Table 5.2: Energy Consumption of TinyAES Decryption









Table 5.3: Energy Consumption of bcon’s AES Encryption









Table 5.4: Energy Consumption of bcon’s AES Decryption









Table 5.5: Energy Consumption of Contiki’s builtin AES Encryption










Table 5.6: Timing of TinyAES Encryption









Table 5.7: Timing of TinyAES Decryption









Table 5.8: Timing of B-con’s AES Encryption









Table 5.9: Timing of B-con’s AES Decryption










Fig. 5.1: Energy consumption of AES implementations
viation is so small compared to the y-axis values. The specific numbers in our findings
on mean energy usage can be found in Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5. The specific
number on encryption/decryption duration can be found in Tables 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, and
5.10.
All the algorithms scale linearly with input size, in terms of both energy consumption
and time to perform the encryption/decryption. The durations are expected because
AES is a block cipher encryption algorithm. Energy is also expected to scale linearly,
although initial confidence was not as high, because it was unclear whether algorithmic
implementations that were not optimized for a smaller processor would have unexpected
adverse e↵ects on energy, such as forcing a much larger drain beyond a certain input
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Fig. 5.2: Encryption duration of AES implementations
size.
Comparing the performance of the three implementations of AES, the results show that
the best algorithm is TinyAES, an algorithmic implementation specifically optimized for
smaller processors. B-Con’s AES algorithm implementation, which is not optimized for
smaller processors, performed more poorly. According to its author, “These algorithms
are not optimized for speed or space. They are primarily designed to be easy to read,
although some basic optimization techniques have been employed.”
In general, it can be assumed that if the implementation is optimized for a larger pro-
cessor, the algorithm would not run correctly on a smaller one. For example, on 32-bit
or larger systems, one can combine the SubBytes and ShiftRows steps of AES, lever-
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Table 5.10: Timing of Contiki’s builtin AES Encryption









aging 32-bit tables using 4096 bytes, something that is impossible on a 16-bit or lower
architecture.
TinyAES and Contiki’s built-in implementation for encryption perform similarly, with
Contiki’s outperforming TinyAES by a hair. At an input size of 1024 bits, Contiki’s
built-in implementation used about 8% less energy and time to perform encryption than
that of TinyAES (Tables 5.1, 5.5, 5.6, 5.8). TinyAES’ implementation used about 84%
less energy and time than that of B-Con’s (Tables 5.1, 5.3, 5.6, 5.8). The aggregated
data shows that specialized algorithms such as TinyaES and Contiki’s built-in AES
algorithm perform better on their target platforms. This is of no surprise, as these
algorithms were quite literally designed to perform better on these systems.
This being said, it should also be noted that AES was originally designed with the
criteria of high speed performance on low RAM devices with processors as small as 8-
bits. This, however, does not mean we cannot further optimize its implementations for
speed and energy consumption, especially with the contemporary ubiquity of constrained
devices.
We investigate the three algorithmic implementations in further detail to better under-
stand how they achieve their performance. AES contains many constant components,
such as the S-BOX lookup tables and round constants (rcon) [31]. All three algorithms
declare these as static constant arrays to leverage ROM versus RAM. as a result, this
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frees up memory when memory is considered a scarce resource. TinyAES o↵ers the abil-
ity to generate the S-BOX tables dynamically, which would trade ROM for RAM. This
makes the TinyaES implementation more flexible, as ROM can be the limiting factor in
certain IoT devices. B-Con’s implementation pre-calculates all possible calculations of
the Galois Field, mainly multiplication. This Galois Field is used in the MixColumns
step of AES, making the operation a two-dimensional array access a faster, vectorized,
multiple step multiplication that can operate on multiple values at the same time.
In general, B-Con’s implementation uses a lot of double array accesses. Additionally,
both TinyAES and Contiki’s implementation attempt to perform as many operations in
a single step as possible. It also seems that TinyAES tried to limit the number of variable
declarations. Although most compilers should have optimization options for constant
folding/propagation [32], which should negate any advantages this would hope to gain.
However, as we had seen in Shammi Didla’s findings, automatic compiler optimization
does not always provide positive results, though manually accommodating code for
optimization, as in aes.c of TinyAES, always did (at least within their experiments).
The following code contains two multiplication helper functions. Notice how TinyAES
gives the option to declare the function either as an actual function or a macro. Within
the actual function, near the last bitshift, the last call to xtime() (line 13) is actually
redundant and unneeded. However, in kokke’s experiments, omitting it tends to create
a larger binary, suggesting that the last call somehow helps the compiler vectorize the
function better.
Listing 5.1: TinyAES’s aes.c
1 stat ic u in t 8 t xtime ( u i n t 8 t x )
2 {




6 #i f MULTIPLY AS A FUNCTION
7 stat ic u in t 8 t Mult ip ly ( u i n t 8 t x , u i n t 8 t y )
8 {
9 return ( ( ( y & 1) ∗ x ) ˆ
10 ( ( y>>1 & 1) ∗ xtime (x ) ) ˆ
11 ( ( y>>2 & 1) ∗ xtime ( xtime (x ) ) ) ˆ
12 ( ( y>>3 & 1) ∗ xtime ( xtime ( xtime (x ) ) ) ) ˆ
13 ( ( y>>4 & 1) ∗ xtime ( xtime ( xtime ( xtime (x ) ) ) ) ) ) ; /∗ t h i s
l a s t c a l l to xtime () can be omit ted ∗/
14 }
15 #else
16 #define Mult ip ly (x , y ) \
17 ( ( ( y & 1) ∗ x ) ˆ \
18 ( ( y>>1 & 1) ∗ xtime (x ) ) ˆ \
19 ( ( y>>2 & 1) ∗ xtime ( xtime (x ) ) ) ˆ \
20 ( ( y>>3 & 1) ∗ xtime ( xtime ( xtime (x ) ) ) ) ˆ \
21 ( ( y>>4 & 1) ∗ xtime ( xtime ( xtime ( xtime (x ) ) ) ) ) ) \
22
23 #endif
We also examined the number of instructions these implementations compiled to for
32-bit ARM without any special compiler options. For example TinyAES’s SubBytes
function compiled to 308 operations while B-Con’s SubByte’s function compiles to 544
operations. For this particular function, this is primarily because TinyAES simply
uses less array accesses and only makes two 2-dimensional array access compared to
31
Listing 5.2: ”TinyAES SubBytes()”
1 stat ic void SubBytes ( s t a t e t ∗ s t a t e )
2 {
3 u in t 8 t i , j ;
4 for ( i = 0 ; i < 4 ; ++i )
5 {
6 for ( j = 0 ; j < 4 ; ++j )
7 {




B-Con’s implementation, which makes three 2-dimensional array accesses (including
assignment) while also performing bitwise operations on the index. TinyAES also uses
a pointer to get the head of the array. Examples of this can be seen in listings 5.2
and 5.3. Overall, it does not seem like TinyAES’ and Contiki’s AES implementations
use drastically di↵erent coding methods than that of B-con’s implementation. The
optimized algorithmic implementations simply limit superfluous code, reducing overall
total operations.
TinyAES also manages to achieve a smaller executable size compared to the other al-
gorithm implementations. TinyAES goes further in its static declarations of constants,
even omitting some of the indices of the round constant word array (Rcon) altogether,
requiring the AES key size to be determined beforehand on start-up. As AES-128, AES-
196- and AES-256 all use di↵erent indices of Rcon and none of them use the zeroth index
[31]. TinyAES also chooses to forgo certain conveniences, such as automatically padding
inputs to match the 128 bit block size. TinyAES even has the option to define multi-
plication as a function or macro, to further reduce the executable size depending on the
compiler used. For example, using the Keil ARM compiler [33], defining multiplication
as a function reducing the executable from 2,087 bytes to 1,268 bytes. Conversely, when
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Listing 5.3: ”B-Con’s AES SubBytes()”
1 void SubBytes (BYTE s t a t e [ ] [ 4 ]
2 )
3 {
4 s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 0 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 0 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 0 ] & 0x0F ] ;
5 s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 1 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 1 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 1 ] & 0x0F ] ;
6 s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 2 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 2 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 2 ] & 0x0F ] ;
7 s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 3 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 3 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 0 ] [ 3 ] & 0x0F ] ;
8 s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 0 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 0 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 0 ] & 0x0F ] ;
9 s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 1 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 1 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 1 ] & 0x0F ] ;
10 s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 2 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 2 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 2 ] & 0x0F ] ;
11 s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 3 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 3 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 1 ] [ 3 ] & 0x0F ] ;
12 s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 0 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 0 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 0 ] & 0x0F ] ;
13 s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 1 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 1 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 1 ] & 0x0F ] ;
14 s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 2 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 2 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 2 ] & 0x0F ] ;
15 s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 3 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 3 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 2 ] [ 3 ] & 0x0F ] ;
16 s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 0 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 0 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 0 ] & 0x0F ] ;
17 s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 1 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 1 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 1 ] & 0x0F ] ;
18 s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 2 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 2 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 2 ] & 0x0F ] ;
19 s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 3 ] = aes sbox [ s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 3 ] >> 4 ] [ s t a t e [ 3 ] [ 3 ] & 0x0F ] ;
20 }
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using the Mentor Bench ARM GCC toolchain [34], compiling with multiply defined
as a macro creates a smaller executable than when defining as a function, respectively
2,087 bytes and 2,130 bytes. TinyAES also uses many #ifndef directives to allow the
option of only loading the functions that are required (e.g. only using ECB). B-Con’s
executable, on the other hand, is 190,245 bytes when compiled for 32-bit ARM. This is
likely due to the numerous pre-calculated, hard-coded, two-dimensional arrays.
As is the case with TinyAES, it seems di↵erent compilers will produce di↵erent exe-
cutable sizes despite building from the same source code and for the same target archi-
tecture. If the best way to reduce encryption duration and energy consumption is to
time and measure the energy of each instruction, and only attempt to only leverage in-
structions that use the fewest clock cycles and least amount of power, then the compiled
binaries per compiler must be examined for the number of these few clock cycle and
low power instructions. Another technique could be simply reducing the total number
of instructions by combining multiple operations, as seen in the TinyAES and Contiki
implementations.
These results demonstrate that spending the e↵ort to further reduce the energy con-
sumption of IoT devices, allowing for a longer field life. This would also take less





In this thesis, we survey the state of security of the Internet of Things landscape and
found that IoT faces many unique challenges that traditional security solutions cannot
yet address. This is primarily due to the sheer number of motes that exist within an
IoT network and motes’ resource constrains, such as lower-bit processors, less storage
capacity, less RAM, and less electrical power. We also survey attempts at optimizing
traditional algorithmic implementations for constrained devices. We found successful
optimizations that leverages hardware and software techniques. In our final surveys, we
find some hard data regarding the performance some of these optimizations compared
to that of traditional algorithms.
Our own findings show that two encryption algorithm implementations optimized for
constrained devices, TinyAES and Contiki’s built-in AES, performed better than B-
Con’s AES, which was not optimized for constrained devices. The optimized algorithm
implementations yield smaller executables, provide faster encryption/decryption run
times, and reduce overall power consumption for the platforms they are optimized for.
Specifically, optimized AES implementations used about 0.16 of the energy and time to
complete encryption and decryption compared to unoptimized implementations.
We investigate the cause of these gains and found the energy and time savings was pri-
marily achieved through a variety of manual optimizations. These include optimizations
in leveraging ROM versus RAM, minimizing total operations, and taking advantage of
vectorized instructions. The actual reduction in executable size, run times, and power
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consumption may vary depending on the compiler used, even for the same source code
and target architecture. These optimizations are not dependent on the actual functions
of Rijndael AES, which means that these optimization techniques can be utilized as to
optimize algorithmic implementations in general.
In combination with the data sets in the literature we surveyed, we hope the quantifiable
metrics found during our experiments further assist in evaluating optimized security
solution for the IoT landscape.
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[33] ARM Compiler v5.06 for ÂţVision armcc User Guide. ARM, 2016. URL
http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.dui0375g/DUI0375G_
mdk_armcc_user_guide.pdf. 32





A.1 CBC Mode for Contiki’s AES implementation
1 stat ic void
2 encrypt cbc ( u i n t 8 t ∗ in , u i n t 8 t ∗ key , u i n t 8 t ∗ iv , unsigned
long s i z e ) {
3 u in t 8 t xor [ 1 0 2 4 ] = {0} ;
4
5 int b locks = s i z e / 16 ;
6
7 for ( int k = 0 ; k < b locks ; k++){
8 int j = k ∗ 16 ;
9 for ( int i = 0 ; i < 16 ; i++){
10 in [ i+j ] = in [ i+j ] ˆ iv [ i ] ;
11 }
12 a e s 1 28 d r i v e r . encrypt ( in+j ) ;




17 const struct a e s 1 28 d r i v e r a e s 1 28 d r i v e r = {





A.2 Sample Clock Cycle Measurement Script
measure clock cycle.c
1
2 //Santa Clara Un ive r s i t y
3 // In t e rn e t o f Things Research Lab (SIOTLAB)
4 //2017
5
6 #inc lude ” c on t i k i . h”
7 #inc lude ”t i  l i b . h”
8 #inc lude ”sys / et imer . h”
9 #inc lude ”sys / ct imer . h”
10 #inc lude ”dev/ l e d s . h”
11 #inc lude ”power measurement . h”
12 #inc lude ”cpu/cc26xx cc13xx/ c l o ck . c ”
13 #inc lude ”sys / c l o ck . h”
14 #inc lude ”dev/ t iny AES128 C/aes . c ”
15
16 #inc lude <s t d i o . h>
17 #inc lude <s t d i n t . h>
18
19 #de f i n e LOOP INTERVAL (150)
43
20 #de f i n e CBC 1
21 #de f i n e SECOND 1000000
22
23 s t a t i c s t r u c t et imer et ;
24 s t a t i c s t r u c t ct imer t imer ;
25
26 v o l a t i l e bool s t a tu s = f a l s e ;
27
28 PROCESS( senso r tag l ed exper iment , ” s en so r tag l ed expe r iment ”) ;
29 AUTOSTART PROCESSES(&senso r tag l ed expe r iment ) ;
30
31 void dump( u in t 8 t ∗ s t r , unsigned long s i z e ) {
32 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < s i z e ; i++){
33 p r i n t f (”%.2x ” , s t r [ i ] ) ;
34 }
35 p r i n t f ( ”\n ”) ;
36 }
37
38 s t a t i c void p r o c e s s t a s k ( void ∗ ptr ) {
39
40 // Local Var i ab l e s
41
42 // Timer Var iab l e s
43 unsigned long t ime s t a r t ;
44 unsigned long t ime stop ;
45 unsigned long c y c l e s ;
46
47 // encrypt ion v a r i a b l e s
44
48 const u i n t 8 t SIZE = 16 ∗ 7 ; // 128 bytes , 1024 b i t s
49 const u in t16 t PAYLOAD SIZE = SIZE ∗ 8 ;
50
51 u in t 8 t key [ ] = {0x2b , 0x7e , 0x15 , 0x16 , 0x28 , 0xae , 0xd2 , 0
xa6 , 0xab , 0xf7 , 0x15 , 0x88 , 0x09 , 0 xcf , 0 x4f , 0x3c } ;
52 u i n t 8 t i v [ ] = {0x00 , 0x01 , 0x02 , 0x03 , 0x04 , 0x05 , 0x06 , 0
x07 , 0x08 , 0x09 , 0x0a , 0x0b , 0x0c , 0x0d , 0x0e , 0 x0f } ;
53
54 u in t 8 t in [ ] = { 0x6b , 0xc1 , 0xbe , 0xe2 , 0x2e , 0x40 , 0x9f ,
0x96 , 0xe9 , 0x3d , 0x7e , 0x11 , 0x73 , 0x93 , 0x17 , 0x2a ,
55 0xae , 0x2d , 0x8a , 0x57 , 0x1e , 0x03 , 0xac , 0x9c , 0x9e , 0
xb7 , 0x6f , 0xac , 0x45 , 0xaf , 0x8e , 0x51 ,
56 0x30 , 0xc8 , 0x1c , 0x46 , 0xa3 , 0x5c , 0xe4 , 0x11 , 0xe5 , 0
xfb , 0xc1 , 0x19 , 0x1a , 0x0a , 0x52 , 0 xef ,
57 0xf6 , 0 x9f , 0x24 , 0x45 , 0xdf , 0 x4f , 0x9b , 0x17 , 0xad , 0
x2b , 0x41 , 0x7b , 0xe6 , 0x6c , 0x37 , 0x10 ,
58 0x6b , 0xc1 , 0xbe , 0xe2 , 0x2e , 0x40 , 0x9f , 0x96 , 0xe9 , 0
x3d , 0x7e , 0x11 , 0x73 , 0x93 , 0x17 , 0x2a ,
59 0xae , 0x2d , 0x8a , 0x57 , 0x1e , 0x03 , 0xac , 0x9c , 0x9e , 0
xb7 , 0x6f , 0xac , 0x45 , 0xaf , 0x8e , 0x51 ,
60 0x30 , 0xc8 , 0x1c , 0x46 , 0xa3 , 0x5c , 0xe4 , 0x11 , 0xe5 , 0
xfb , 0xc1 , 0x19 , 0x1a , 0x0a , 0x52 , 0 xef ,
61 0xf6 , 0 x9f , 0x24 , 0x45 , 0xdf , 0 x4f , 0x9b , 0x17 , 0xad , 0
x2b , 0x41 , 0x7b , 0xe6 , 0x6c , 0x37 , 0x10 } ; //8   1024
62
63 u in t 8 t in [ 2 0 4 8 ] = {0} ;




67 p r i n t f ( ” S i z e : %d\n ” , PAYLOAD SIZE) ;
68 p r i n t f ( ”PRE out : ”) ;
69 dump( out , SIZE) ;
70
71 l ed s on (LEDS RED) ;
72 // start power measurement ( ) ;
73 t ime s t a r t = RTIMERNOW() ;
74
75 // =============== //
76 // START MEASURING //
77 // =============== //
78
79 u in t16 t TRIALS = 100 ;
80 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < TRIALS ; i++){
81 AES CBC encrypt buffer ( out , in , SIZE , key , i v ) ;
82 }
83 // ============= //
84 // END MEASURING //
85 // ============= //
86
87 // end power measurement ( ) ;
88 t ime stop = RTIMERNOW() ;
89 c y c l e s = t ime stop   t ime s t a r t ;
90
91 p r i n t f ( ”POST out : ”) ;
92 dump( out , SIZE) ;
93
46
94 p r i n t f ( ”START: %lu \n ” , t ime s t a r t ) ;
95 p r i n t f ( ”STOP: %lu \n ” , t ime stop ) ;
96 p r i n t f ( ” cyc l e s , r t imer second : %lu %d\n ” , cyc l e s ,
RTIMER SECOND) ;
97 p r i n t f ( ”MILISECONDS: %g\n ” , m i l i s e conds ) ;
98
99 l e d s o f f (LEDS RED) ;
100
101 c t ime r r e s e t (&timer ) ;
102 }
103
104 PROCESS THREAD( senso r tag l ed expe r iment , ev , data )
105 {
106 PROCESS BEGIN( ) ;
107 p r i n t f ( ”CC26XX LED Experiment\n ”) ;
108
109 c l o c k i n i t ( ) ;
110 e t ime r s e t (&et , LOOP INTERVAL) ;
111 c t ime r s e t (&timer , LOOP INTERVAL/2 , p roce s s ta sk , NULL) ;
112 init power measurement ( ) ;
113
114 // Time to s l e e p in microseconds ( e . g . 1000000 = 1 second )
115
116 whi l e (1 ) {
117
118 // s l e e p 1 seconds
119 // c l o c k d e l ay u s e c takes u int16 t , so a f o r loop was
the bes t way to ab s t r a c t
47
120 u in t16 t SLEEP MILISECONDS = 10 ;
121 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < SLEEP MILISECONDS; i++){
122 c l o c k d e l ay u s e c (1000) ;
123 }
124
125 PROCESS WAIT EVENT UNTIL( e t imer exp i r ed (&et ) ) ;
126
127 // r e tu rn s the cur r ent system time in c l o ck t i c k s
128 p r i n t f ( ”Clock time : %lu \n ” , c l o ck t ime ( ) ) ;
129
130 // r e tu rn s the cur r ent system time in seconds
131 p r i n t f ( ”Clock seconds : %lu \n ” , c l o ck s e conds ( ) ) ;
132
133 // p r i n t f ( ”Toggle red LED\n ”) ;




138 PROCESS END() ;
139 }
A.3 Sample Energy Measurement Script
power measurement.h
1
2 //Santa Clara Un i v e r s i t y
48






9 #include ”c on t i k i . h”
10 #include ”t i  l i b . h”
11 #include ”sys / et imer . h”
12 #include ”sys / ct imer . h”
13 #include ”dev/ l e d s . h”
14
15 void in it power measurement ( )
16 {
17 GPIO setOutputEnableDio (BOARD IOID DP0, 1 ) ;
18 GPIO setOutputEnableDio (BOARD IOID DP2, 1 ) ;
19
20 GPIO setDio (BOARD IOID DP0) ;
21 GPIO setDio (BOARD IOID DP2) ;
22 }
23
24 // Commands the power measurement dev i c e to s t a r t measurement
25 void start power measurement ( )
26 {
27 GPIO clearDio (BOARD IOID DP0) ;





32 // Commands the power measurement dev i c e to s top measurement
33 void end power measurement ( )
34 {
35 GPIO clearDio (BOARD IOID DP2) ;





1 //Santa Clara Un i v e r s i t y
2 // In t e rne t o f Things Research Lab (SIOTLAB)
3 //2017
4
5 #include ”c on t i k i . h”
6 #include ”t i  l i b . h”
7 #include ”sys / et imer . h”
8 #include ”sys / ct imer . h”
9 #include ”dev/ l e d s . h”
10 #include ”power measurement . h”
11 #include ”cpu/cc26xx cc13xx/ c l o ck . c ”
12 #include ”sys / c l o ck . h”
13 #include ”dev/ tiny AES128 C/aes . c ”
14
15 #include <s t d i o . h>
16 #include <s t d i n t . h>
50
17
18 #define LOOP INTERVAL (150)
19 #define CBC 1
20 #define SECOND 1000000
21
22 stat ic struct et imer et ;
23 stat ic struct ct imer t imer ;
24
25 volat i le bool s t a tu s = f a l s e ;
26
27 PROCESS( senso r tag l ed exper iment , ” s en so r tag l ed expe r iment ”) ;
28 AUTOSTART PROCESSES(&senso r tag l ed expe r iment ) ;
29
30 void dump( u in t 8 t ∗ s t r , unsigned long s i z e ) {
31 for ( int i = 0 ; i < s i z e ; i++){
32 p r i n t f ( ”%.2x” , s t r [ i ] ) ;
33 }
34 p r i n t f ( ”\n”) ;
35 }
36
37 stat ic void p ro c e s s t a s k (void ∗ ptr ) {
38
39 // Local Var iab l e s
40
41 // Timer Var iab l e s
42 unsigned long t ime s t a r t ;
43 unsigned long t ime stop ;
44 unsigned long c y c l e s ;
51
45
46 // encryp t ion v a r i a b l e s
47 const u in t 8 t SIZE = 16 ∗ 7 ; // 128 bytes , 1024 b i t s
48 const u in t16 t PAYLOAD SIZE = SIZE ∗ 8 ;
49
50 u in t 8 t key [ ] = {0x2b , 0x7e , 0x15 , 0x16 , 0x28 , 0xae , 0xd2 , 0
xa6 , 0xab , 0xf7 , 0x15 , 0x88 , 0x09 , 0 xcf , 0 x4f , 0x3c } ;
51 u i n t 8 t i v [ ] = {0x00 , 0x01 , 0x02 , 0x03 , 0x04 , 0x05 , 0x06 , 0
x07 , 0x08 , 0x09 , 0x0a , 0x0b , 0x0c , 0x0d , 0x0e , 0 x0f } ;
52
53 u in t 8 t in [ ] = { 0x6b , 0xc1 , 0xbe , 0xe2 , 0x2e , 0x40 , 0x9f ,
0x96 , 0xe9 , 0x3d , 0x7e , 0x11 , 0x73 , 0x93 , 0x17 , 0x2a ,
54 0xae , 0x2d , 0x8a , 0x57 , 0x1e , 0x03 , 0xac , 0x9c , 0x9e , 0
xb7 , 0x6f , 0xac , 0x45 , 0xaf , 0x8e , 0x51 ,
55 0x30 , 0xc8 , 0x1c , 0x46 , 0xa3 , 0x5c , 0xe4 , 0x11 , 0xe5 , 0
xfb , 0xc1 , 0x19 , 0x1a , 0x0a , 0x52 , 0 xef ,
56 0xf6 , 0 x9f , 0x24 , 0x45 , 0xdf , 0 x4f , 0x9b , 0x17 , 0xad , 0
x2b , 0x41 , 0x7b , 0xe6 , 0x6c , 0x37 , 0x10 ,
57 0x6b , 0xc1 , 0xbe , 0xe2 , 0x2e , 0x40 , 0x9f , 0x96 , 0xe9 , 0
x3d , 0x7e , 0x11 , 0x73 , 0x93 , 0x17 , 0x2a ,
58 0xae , 0x2d , 0x8a , 0x57 , 0x1e , 0x03 , 0xac , 0x9c , 0x9e , 0
xb7 , 0x6f , 0xac , 0x45 , 0xaf , 0x8e , 0x51 ,
59 0x30 , 0xc8 , 0x1c , 0x46 , 0xa3 , 0x5c , 0xe4 , 0x11 , 0xe5 , 0
xfb , 0xc1 , 0x19 , 0x1a , 0x0a , 0x52 , 0 xef ,
60 0xf6 , 0 x9f , 0x24 , 0x45 , 0xdf , 0 x4f , 0x9b , 0x17 , 0xad , 0
x2b , 0x41 , 0x7b , 0xe6 , 0x6c , 0x37 , 0x10 } ; //8   1024
61
62 u in t 8 t in [ 2 0 4 8 ] = {0} ;
52
63 u in t 8 t out [ 2 0 4 8 ] = {0} ;
64
65 // Driver
66 p r i n t f ( ”S i z e : %d\n” , PAYLOAD SIZE) ;
67 p r i n t f ( ”PRE out : ”) ;
68 dump( out , SIZE) ;
69
70 l ed s on (LEDS RED) ;
71 start power measurement ( ) ;
72
73 // =============== //
74 // START MEASURING //
75 // =============== //
76
77 u in t16 t TRIALS = 100 ;
78 for ( int i = 0 ; i < TRIALS ; i++){
79 AES CBC encrypt buffer ( out , in , SIZE , key , i v ) ;
80 }
81 // ============= //
82 // END MEASURING //
83 // ============= //
84
85 end power measurement ( ) ;
86
87 p r i n t f ( ”POST out : ”) ;
88 dump( out , SIZE) ;
89
90 l e d s o f f (LEDS RED) ;
53
91
92 c t ime r r e s e t (&timer ) ;
93 }
94
95 PROCESS THREAD( senso r tag l ed expe r iment , ev , data )
96 {
97 PROCESS BEGIN( ) ;
98 p r i n t f ( ”CC26XX LED Experiment\n”) ;
99
100 c l o c k i n i t ( ) ;
101 e t ime r s e t (&et , LOOP INTERVAL) ;
102 c t ime r s e t (&timer , LOOP INTERVAL/2 , p roce s s ta sk , NULL) ;
103 init power measurement ( ) ;
104
105 // Time to s l e e p in microseconds ( e . g . 1000000 = 1 second )
106
107 while (1 ) {
108
109 // s l e e p 1 seconds
110 // c l o c k d e l a y u s e c t a k e s u in t16 t , so a f o r loop was
the b e s t way to a b s t r a c t
111 u in t16 t SLEEP MILISECONDS = 10 ;
112 for ( int i = 0 ; i < SLEEP MILISECONDS; i++){
113 c l o c k d e l ay u s e c (1000) ;
114 }
115
116 PROCESS WAIT EVENT UNTIL( e t imer exp i r ed (&et ) ) ;
117
54
118 // re turns the curren t system time in c l o c k t i c k s
119 p r i n t f ( ”Clock time : %lu \n” , c l o ck t ime ( ) ) ;
120
121 // re turns the curren t system time in seconds
122 p r i n t f ( ”Clock seconds : %lu \n” , c l o ck s e conds ( ) ) ;
123
124 // p r i n t f ( ”Toggle red LED\n”) ;




129 PROCESS END() ;
55
